Research
Capital flows·Open-access research article · CFIR-funded

The role of venture capital funds in dissemination and development of innovation in Canada

Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 14(1), Article 90. doi.org/10.1186/s13731-025-00555-z

Marat Ressin

Founder and President, York Entrepreneurship Development Institute (YEDI)

Funded by Canadian Foundation for Innovation and Research

The aim of this study was to determine the role of venture capital funds in promoting innovative development in Canada and to identify regional features of their effectiveness in developing recommendations for optimizing the venture and innovation ecosystem. The subject matter of the research was limited to an analysis of the activities of Venture Capital Funds affiliated with accelerators.

The research methodology is based on calculations of business survival rates, patent approval rates, and overall venture activity for each province in Canada. Data were collected from various sources, including Canadian statistical databases and venture fund reports. Correlation analysis methods were applied to identify dependencies between venture and innovation indicators. To assess regional success, both quantitative (investment volume, patent number) and qualitative parameters (startup survival rates) were used.

The results demonstrate a close relationship between the volume of venture capital deals and innovation activity. The analysis revealed a significant concentration of venture capital in the largest provinces of the country (Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta), which leads to regional imbalances and limits the potential of less developed regions. The study presents recommendations for creating conditions that could ensure the redistribution of financial flows, accelerate the commercialization of promising technologies, and increase the overall sustainability of startups in less developed provinces.

01Motivation

Why the geography of risk capital matters for innovation outcomes

Canadian innovation policy has long treated venture capital as a national resource — quoted as a single number, debated as a single market. The paper opens by questioning that framing. The standing literature on venture capital and innovation1 argues that risk capital, knowledge spillovers, and entrepreneurial activity localize tightly; if that holds, the productive question is not how much VC the country has, but where it lands and what it does once it gets there.

The motivation, in other words, is structural. A national average can mask a distribution in which most provinces operate in a thin-capital regime that the headline number renders invisible. The paper's contribution is to make that distribution legible and then to ask whether it tracks the outcomes innovation policy actually claims to influence — firm survival and patenting.

The right unit of analysis for Canadian VC is the province, not the country.
02Data and method

A province-level dataset, normalized and cross-checked

The unit of analysis is the province. The paper assembles three series — venture deal volume, business survival, and patent approval activity — for all ten Canadian provinces, then normalizes each so that Ontario and Prince Edward Island can be read on the same axis. As the abstract states, data are collected from Canadian statistical databases and venture-fund reports; the analytical move is correlation analysis between venture and innovation indicators. The contribution is in the assembly, the harmonization, and the discipline of refusing to compare absolute counts. The methodological logic of treating pre- and post-investment outcomes as separable channels is consistent with recent VC-impact work9.

01

Sources

Provincial deal data, Statistics Canada firm-level records, patent registries

02

Cleaning

De-duplication, harmonization of province codes, period alignment

03

Indexing

Per-capita and per-firm normalization across the ten provinces

04

Comparison

Regional asymmetry described, then cross-checked against firm outcomes

05

Synthesis

Patterns interpreted against the policy question, with limits stated

Figure 4. From sources to synthesis. The analytical pipeline used in the paper. Each stage is a checkable interface: provincial counts before cleaning, normalized indices before comparison, named limits before synthesis. The structure makes the eventual interpretation auditable rather than rhetorical.

Two methodological choices are worth flagging up front. First, the analysis is descriptive: it documents the distribution and its co-movements with outcomes, but does not advance a causal claim about VC's effect on survival or patenting. Second, the period and sample are stated rather than naturalized — readers can replicate the indices on a different window without rebuilding the framework.

03Results · part i

Where the venture capital is

The first finding is the distribution itself. Four provinces — Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta — carry the bulk of the country's deal volume; the remaining six provinces operate in a markedly thinner-capital environment. The pattern is not a smooth gradient. It is a step function with a steep drop after the leaders, and the consequence is structural: peripheral provinces operate without local risk capital of comparable scale, regardless of their absolute prospects. The international evidence on micro venture capital3 shows how thin-capital regions can develop alternative financing channels — a route the Canadian periphery has yet to consolidate at scale.

BC
ON
QC
BC
AB
SK
MB
ON
QC
NB
NS
PE
NL
West
Lower
Higher
East
Figure 1. Provincial concentration of venture capital activity. Schematic. Bar height encodes the relative concentration of deal volume across provinces, ordered west to east. The qualitative pattern — Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta carrying the bulk of activity, with the remaining six provinces trailing — is the structural finding the paper formalizes; precise figures appear in the published article.

The right way to read this figure is not as a ranking but as a description of where the capital infrastructure exists. The paper resists the temptation to call any province "underperforming" — that framing presumes a uniform ground that the data does not support. The analysis names the distribution and asks what it costs, rather than asking which province is failing to keep up.

04Results · part ii

Survival follows density, but not linearly

The second finding pairs the VC distribution with business survival. The framing draws on the broader literature establishing that venture-backed firms differ systematically from their peers in innovation outcomes2; the paper asks the regional version of that question. The relationship is positive — provinces with denser VC presence tend to show higher startup survival — but the curve is concave: most of the survival gain accrues in the lower half of the VC density range, with diminishing returns above the median.

40%45%50%55%60%0.000.250.500.751.00PENLNBNSSKMBABBCQCONVC density (normalized, illustrative)5-year business survival
Figure 2. Business survival as a function of regional VC density. Schematic. Each marker is one province; the curve illustrates a positive but attenuating relationship between local risk-capital availability and five-year survival of incorporated firms. The paper documents the direction and shape of this relationship; magnitudes and correlation coefficients appear in the published article.

The shape matters. A linear story would suggest that more VC produces more survival monotonically; the concave shape suggests something narrower — that minimal local availability of risk capital pulls survival into a healthier band, while additional capacity at the top of the distribution does relatively less for the survival metric. Readers should treat this as a structural observation, not a dose-response curve.

05Results · part iii

Patenting tracks capital — except where it doesn't

The third finding compares patent activity to VC volume across provinces. Recent evidence from the Korean6 and Chinese7 contexts has shown that VC backing materially raises corporate technological innovation — the present paper extends that question to a regional setting. At the top of the distribution the two indices move together: the provinces with the most VC also produce the most patent approvals per capita. The interesting cases are the gaps — provinces where patenting outruns local VC, or where local VC outruns patenting.

0.250.500.751.00ONQCBCABNSMBSKNBNLPEProvinceNormalized indexPatents per capitaVC deal volume
Figure 3. Co-movement of patent activity and VC deal volume across provinces. Schematic. Patent activity tracks venture capital concentration closely at the top of the distribution; the gap between the two indices is informative for the Prairies and Atlantic provinces, where patenting outpaces or lags the local supply of risk capital. The paper documents the direction of these gaps; precise magnitudes appear in the published article.

Read carefully, this figure is a diagnostic. A province with strong patenting and weak local VC is producing inventive output that has to leave the province for capital — a leak the paper takes seriously. The opposite case — local VC without commensurate patenting — points to capital that may be flowing into established firms rather than into invention.

06Editor's reading

What the paper establishes, and what it deliberately does not

Read as a whole, the paper does three things well. It establishes the unit of analysis — the province, not the country. It documents a distribution that is steeper than the national headline implies. And it cross-checks that distribution against two outcome measures with enough discipline that the reader can see the structure rather than be told about it.

What the paper deliberately stops short of is a causal claim. The relationships it documents are descriptive: the data is consistent with a story in which local risk capital supports survival and invention, but the analysis does not isolate that channel from the host of provincial covariates that move with VC density. The author is explicit about this limit, and it is the correct call. Work on government venture capital programs5 and on the moderating effect of business environment on fiscal-and-VC interactions4 is a useful reminder of how easily descriptive co-movement gets misread as policy efficacy.

The contribution is to make the distribution legible. The interpretation it invites is for the next paper, the next dataset, and the policy room.

Two natural follow-ups present themselves. First, a longitudinal extension would let the same framework distinguish provinces that are converging on the leaders from those falling behind. Second, an instrumented analysis could begin to separate the local-availability channel from selection — whether better firms move toward capital, or whether capital, once present, lifts the firms it finds. Recent work on the international relocation of startups in response to venture capital8 suggests one direction such an extension might take, especially for provinces where patenting outpaces local VC supply.

07Implications

What changes if the distribution is taken seriously

The policy reading is straightforward and difficult at once. Straightforward, because once the distribution is on the table, "more VC nationally" is the wrong instrument — the problem is geographic, and so is its remedy. Difficult, because the levers that change a regional capital base — anchor funds, designated institutions, public-private vehicles — are slower than the press cycle that frames the issue. The synthesis Lerner and Nanda have offered for venture capital and innovation1 applies here with regional emphasis: the question is not whether risk capital matters, but where it is allowed to take root.

For CFIR specifically, the paper sharpens the case that designated-institution work and applied research are not parallel programs but a single argument: a country whose risk capital sits in two or three places needs intermediaries elsewhere that translate between local entrepreneurial capacity and the national capital base. This is the role designated institutions are designed to play.

08References

Works cited and data sources

  1. 01
    Lerner, J., & Nanda, R. (2023). Venture capital and innovation. In Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Finance (Chapter 22, pp. 77–105). Elsevier.
  2. 02
    Aldatmaz, S., & Celikyurt, U. (2023). The effect of venture capital backing on innovation in newly public firms. Journal of Empirical Finance, 74, 101436. link
  3. 03
    Amore, M. D., Conti, A., & Pelucco, V. (2023). Micro venture capital. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 17(4), 886–924. link
  4. 04
    Bai, C., & Zheng, J. (2024). Moderating effect of business environment on the relationship between fiscal science and technology expenditure and venture capital. International Review of Financial Analysis, 96, 103655. link
  5. 05
    Cui, J., Zhang, S., Yin, X., & Xu, K. (2021). Determinants of investment timing of government venture capital guiding funds in China. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2021, 7140807. link
  6. 06
    Lee, K., Oh, F. D., Shin, D., & Yoon, H. (2023). Does venture capital investment enhance corporate innovation? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 50(1–2), 236–266. link
  7. 07
    Sun, S. L., Santos, R. S., & Qin, L. (2024). Divergent trajectories on frontier innovations: A comparison of international venture capital-invested ventures between China and the United States. Technovation, 137, 103094. link
  8. 08
    Weik, S., Achleitner, A. K., & Braun, R. (2024). Venture capital and the international relocation of startups. Research Policy, 53(7), 105031. link
  9. 09
    Xie, C., & Wang, Z. (2025). Impact of venture capital on firm's technological innovation: Empirical study based on the strategy of pre- and post-investment. Managerial and Decision Economics, 46(2), 1330–1343. link
  10. 10
    Yu, P., Dai, H., Zhu, J., Hamori, S., Dong, R. K., & Yue, X. (2024). How does venture capital play a role in corporate green innovation? Evidence from China. International Review of Economics & Finance, 96, 103654. link

Selected from the article's 50+ references; the complete bibliography is available in the open-access publication on Springer.

09Citation

Cite the paper

APA

Ressin, M. (2025). The role of venture capital funds in dissemination and development of innovation in Canada. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 14(1), 90. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13731-025-00555-z

BibTeX

@article{ressin2025vc,
  title     = {The role of venture capital funds in dissemination and development of innovation in Canada},
  author    = {Ressin, Marat},
  journal   = {Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship},
  volume    = {14},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {90},
  year      = {2025},
  doi       = {10.1186/s13731-025-00555-z},
  publisher = {Springer},
}